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INTRODUCTION 
In the decade or so, many countries started the reform of their legal and organisational 
frameworks for public transport, aiming to obtain better performances and improve the market 
shares of these services. Only a few cities succeeded in introducing effective change and 
overcome barriers to the reform process.  Several background studies have exhaustively 
identified and assessed these barriers for different types of cities, but there is a deficit of 
analysis on the paths which were followed by those few cities which succeeded in the reform 
process. 
 
In the background of this wave of reform is the evolution of urban areas that occurred in the 
last decades and changed patterns of mobility from a radial concentric shape towards a typical 
interaction spread across peri-urban areas and very often reducing the role of the traditional 
city centre. Indeed, some authors define the city on basis of a functional community area, 
representing a self-contained labor and social market area characterized by high frequencies 
of interaction (Frey and Speare, 1995, pp 139-190).  
 
This new pattern of interactions led the organised mobility services to extend beyond the 
administrative borders of the city and, consequently, the need to extend the scope of 
intervention of the mobility authority to all communities with a direct stake in the mobility 
system became more obvious. This is easier said than done, and in effect only rarely 
governance institutions have been adjusted to this new systemic dimension of the urban 
mobility systems.   
 
The rationale behind this problem of extension of the scope of action and influence of the 
mobility system is relatively easy to understand but raises additional problems between that 
scope of action and the scope of intervention of the different institutions in charge of the 
several aspects of the system, such as territorial definition, financial autonomies, etc.  
 
Based on research projects and our personal experience observing and advising on the reform 
of some of these types of systems we have identified different sets of factors that contribute to 
form those additional problems (Macário, 2005 and Viegas, 2005). These are related with 
institutional development problems, adjustments and strengthening of institutions to face long 
and short term development goals, which has often been neglected along the years. Urban 
mobility systems are prone to problems of misfit between institutional design and required 
geographical powers of intervention and problems of articulation between horizontal 
specialisation of the different governance areas with impact in urban mobility, meaning 
complexity of the network of institutions and decision processes.  
 
In this paper we provide the analysis of three different types of solutions which seem to be 
pioneers in adjusting institutions and governance, these are: the American Metropolitan 
Planning organizations; the reform of counties in Copenhagen; the associations of 
municipalities in Portugal and the Law of Consortia in Brazil.  
 
SCOPE OF ACTION AND INFLUENCE OF THE MOBILITY SYSTEM 
The pattern of institutional interaction is based on the functionality concept which in turn is 
related to the territorial dimension, as referred in Macário (2005, pp 5) - defined by economic 
and social interactions and lying on a concept of continuity of interdependencies, materially 
represented by the services provided to communities and by their collective interests.  
 
As recognized by (Viegas, 2003) the definition of the contemporary city is ambiguous and 
complex, the former because it depends on relations of “belonging”, regarding territory, 
people and even institutions. Complexity in turn, grows from the spread to peri-urban areas 
which imposes a diversity of spatial relations, with each citizen very often relating with two 
urban areas or having stronger links to other cities than the ones where she formally (i.e. 
administratively) has her residence. 
 
The territorial definition of the urban mobility system is indispensable to define the 
boundaries within which the power of institutions that are in charge of its governance is 
exercised. But we often observe a mismatch between the spatial insertion of the urban 
mobility services and the administrative organization of the institutions with responsibilities 
over the system. In fact this is a major source of underperformance for institutions and 
systems.  
 
The system boundary is indeed a rather unstable definition, dependent on too many factors, 
such as: the judgment of the observer on what she takes as being the system; legal and 
technological competencies that underpin respectively the actors’ territorial and spatial 
competences (authorities and operators); and the actors’ technical capabilities. Besides, in 
reality what we have is two sets of decision-makers, one set in the supply side that even where 
there is a good organizational framework, only rarely addresses the decision at system level; 
and another one in the demand side which is characterized by hundreds of disorganized 
decisions. 
 
As noted by (Viegas, 2005, pp 8) transport is one of the policy areas where there is a greater 
split of competencies across levels of the Administration, and if this decentralization is largely 
related to the recognition that mobility problems are better identified and dealt with if the 
decision-maker is closer to the source of problem, there is also a strong motivation in the 
domain of fiscal responsibility, leading local and regional administrations to take the hard and 
publicly accountable decisions on the application of public money.  
 
CHANGE IN INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
Change is inevitably a difficult undertaking whenever institutions are related to territorial 
sources and expressions of power. Understanding change is first and foremost a matter of 
understanding interactions between the entities that form a specific organizational field and its 
environment. Political networks and communities work on the basis of influence, domination and 
also a considerable degree of implicit and voluntary trust with unofficial rules of appropriateness.  
Trusting behaviors can be defined following (Lorenz, 1989, in Gambetta, 1989, pp 194-210) who 
settled these as a sort of behavior that “consists in action that (1) increases one’s vulnerability to 
another whose behavior is not under one’s control, and (2) takes place in a situation where the penalty 
suffered if the trust is abused would lead one to regret the action”.  
 
The observation of institutional behaviour in different sectors of activity led (Macário, 2005a) 
to ascertain that change is more likely to occur when institutions possess no rules binding 
their usual behaviour or defining the appropriateness of their behaviour. The “no rules arena”, 
just like it is often used in the policy participatory processes is a powerful instrument to boost 
change processes. 
 
A barrier to change is thus something that is causing hindrance, preventing progress or 
movement. In an evolutionary process barriers exist all the time, they are part of a natural 
cause-effect dynamics and always represent a negative effect on the evolutionary process 
where they are present. They can be visible or not limiting the decision maker’s awareness 
and consequent action. Barriers can also be material or immaterial and within the latter it can 
still have a visible or hidden representation. Besides, the classification of barriers can not 
ignore the stage of development of the change process itself. A barrier can be more or less 
severe depending on the moment in which it is raised and the potential damage (political or 
otherwise) that can result.  
 
In fact, there is a great diversity of ways to classify the different kinds of barriers. Moreover, 
within the diverse array of barriers that can be recognised it is possible to verify that they can 
overlap each other, be inter-related or even nested within each other.  From our observation 
we conclude that barriers can be classified according to their end-object of incidence, that is: 
 
• Resource related: Relates with the lack of financial, material or human resources 
to implement the change  
• Process related: Related with the change process itself, including coalition games 
between stakeholders 
• Framework related: Related with the overall environment where the change 
process is embedded, including the aspects related with the rules of change, 
legislation, statute of the actors, etc.  
 
This interpretation seems to be well adjusted to reality if we complement the analysis of 
barriers by further disaggregating it into consensus building levels, where intervention occurs, 
taking into account the concept of level of social analysis originally proposed by (Williamson, 
2000, pp 608), where each level determines the scope of intervention of the respective actors. 
This distinction gains importance due to the fact that instruments and measures cannot be 
freely established within the institutional framework, so the identification of the governance 
level and scope of intervention are extremely important to enable the correct allocation of 
measures to overcome barriers. Within this perspective we can observe barriers at the 
following levels (EC, 2003, MARETOPE, D4, pp 43):  
 
• L1: cultural and social regime: entailing the cultural, ideological, political and 
social orientations; 
• L2: regulatory context: entailing the laws to which the different mobility services 
and actors are submitted, as defined above; 
• L3: regulatory framework:  entailing the general rules that are decided for the 
organisational field of transport, within the scope of the law; 
• L4: organisational forms for governance: entailing the choice of organisational 
form by authorities and operators within the scope of the existing laws and 
regulations; 
• L5: contractual relationships: entailing the choice of incentives (contractual 
relations) between actors, within the scope of laws, regulations and organisational 
forms;  
• L6: allocation of resources: decisions to be taken concerning conflicting allocation 
of budget and/or resources within the same institution. 
 
A hierarchy exists between these levels. They are classified with decreasing level of temporal 
inertia for change to produce effects (e.g. traditions generally have a longer change process 
than laws, which generally also take longer to change than regulation rules, and so forth until 
the allocation of resources). Thus, from L1 to L6 each level largely determines the scope and 
configuration of the next one. Besides, each of the hierarchical levels has a specific context in 
which not all measures and instruments are equally effective. Consequently, each governance 
level has a possible set of instruments and each instrument optimises its effectiveness in a 
certain governance level. Moreover, each barrier level has different degrees of intervention in 
the decision levels of the system, the higher barrier levels having a stronger presence in the 
strategic decision levels and the lower ones at the operational level.   
 
The role of each agent is thus dependent and influenced by the level where its intervention 
takes place, that is to the degrees of freedom to act within the system and to the power that 
agents have over one another. Consequently the potential to raise barriers is also affected by 
that delimitation. From our observation of the change cases in urban mobility systems we 
conclude that the process of raising and overcoming a barrier is bound by three basic 
elements: actors/institutions; territories and instruments (EC, 2004, TRANSPLUS, D4.2, pp 
35). 
 
A barrier is frequently a consequence of an actor’s attitude regarding his position in the 
territory he perceives to be under his area of influence and of the instruments available to 
develop effective opposition. Like with a boomerang effect, the barrier life cycle gives place 
to the development of instruments that aim to mitigate the barrier but, as this occurs, a new 
potential is also raised that another stakeholder group might be affected by the impacts caused 
by the intervention with the new instrument. To some extent we can then say that there are 
cascade effects in this evolutionary path.  
 
In the following section we analyse three alternative ways of adjusting institutions and 
governance, acting on levels L4 and L3 above, that were largely motivated by the existence of 
resource and process related barriers in the development of the existing traditional 
organisational settings.  
 
PIONEERS ADJUSTING INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 
Metropolitan planning organizations1  
 
In the early 1970’s the United States Congress decided that urban areas with more than 
50.000 population should require the creation of an entity designated by MPO-Metropolitan 
Planning Organization, with the aim of ensuring that existing and future expenditures for 
transportation projects and programs were based on a consistent, continued, cooperative and 
comprehensive planning process. At the time the main reason for the creation of MPO’s were 
(Plumeau, 2005, pp 4):  
 
• Need for an appropriate allocation of scarce funding resources (federal and 
others);  
• Planning needs to reflect the region’s future strategy;  
• The understanding that adequate planning requires examination of scenarios of 
future development of regions and urban areas and respective alternatives for 
investment; and  
• A consensus building organisation like a MPO’s can facilitate the collaboration of 
governments, stakeholders and residents in the planning process 
 
In brief, we can understand that the perception of transaction costs and also opportunity costs, 
included in the assessment of the alternatives for application of federal transportation funds is 
sufficiently relevant to motivate metropolitan regionwide planning supported in governmental 
collaboration and consensus-based decision-making.  
 
However, MPO’s are not always lean structures; they often include a wide variety of 
committees and even professional staff. Their structure is not uniform across the US, but it is 
common to have their internal structure divided in the following bodies:  
 
• Political Committee, who represents the top-level decision making body and is 
usually composed by the elected representatives of the local municipalities taking 
part of the MPO, representatives of transport modes, and representatives of State 
Agencies;  
• Technical Committee, that act mostly as advisors to the political committee 
• MPO’s professional staff for technical matters mostly related to planning, analysis 
and follow-up of tasks and projects, although reported experience reveals that 
most MPO’s require also some staff dedicated to the MPO process itself, due to 
complexity and time-consumption associated to the building consensus process.  
 
All MPO's are governed by federal legislation called “The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, 
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)”. The MPO 
planning process is a prerequisite to the area receiving federal funds for airport, transit and 
highway improvements. According to their association there are today 385 MPO’s in the 
United States. The following functions are commonly understood to be the core functions of 
an MPO (Plumeau, 2005, pp 3):  
 
                                                 
1 Largely based on the works and discussions held by the TRB’ Metropolitan Planning Organization Committee where the second author is 
a member.  
• Establish a setting: Establish and manage a fair and impartial setting for effective 
regional decision-making in the metropolitan area;  
• Evaluate alternatives: Evaluate transportation alternatives, scaled to the size and 
complexity of the region, to the nature of its transportation issues, and to the 
realistically available options 
• Maintain a Long-Range Transportation Plan (LRTP): Develop and update a 
fiscally-constrained long-range transportation plan for the metropolitan area 
covering a planning horizon of at least 20 years that fosters 
• mobility and access for people and goods 
• efficient system performance and preservation, and 
• quality of life 
• Develop a Transportation Improvement Program (TIP): Develop a fiscally-
constrained program based on the long-range transportation plan and designed to 
serve the area’s goals, using spending, regulating, operating, management, and 
financial tools.  
• Involve the public: Involve the general public and all the significantly affected 
sub-groups in the four essential functions listed above 
 
The MPO’s have no authority to levy taxes, the funding of operations is supported by a 
combination of federal, state and local funds. Since 1991, with the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), MPO’s gained some prominence as this act provided 
additional (double) funding to these institutions and enlarged their authority to select projects 
and other metropolitan initiatives related to public participation. 
 
An innovative aspect of  ISTEA has been the introduction of fiscally constrained planning, 
that is MPO’s plans can only contain the ones that are financially feasible taking into account 
the expected revenues, which is a clear enforcement to the MPO’s responsibility for hard 
decisions on definitions of priorities.  
 
No reports were found on barriers or oppositions to the implementation of these 
organizations. It is worth noting that they do not overlap competencies with the traditional 
institutional structure. They cover a missing gap in the institutional coverage of territory by 
acting exclusively on common interests of the municipalities that form the MPO   
 
THE COPENHAGEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM2 
Last 1st January 2007 the government of Denmark implemented a reform of its jurisdictional 
organization in order to enable a better answer to the provision of public services. The reform 
was driven by health concerns but was extended to all public services, transport included. The 
drafting of the reform was initiated in October 2002, and the last time Denmark implemented 
a local government reform, before the current one, was in 1970 and for similar motives.  
 
The main elements of the reform were:  
 
• New jurisdictional inner borders of Denmark, including new municipalities;  
• New distribution of tasks between institutions;  
• New financing and equalization of the system.  
 
                                                 
2 Information on this reform was obtained in local interviews undertaken by the authors to the Copenhagen Municipality, the Danish 
Ministry of Transport and to Movia Public Transport in May 2007.  
To a certain extent it can be said that the current reform prolonged the one undertaken in 
1970. Denmark, before 1970, was divided into 86 boroughs and about 1300 parishes within 
25 council districts. One of the main reasons for the 1970 reform was the fact that buildings in 
the borough had came across the boundaries of the neighboring municipalities, causing all 
sorts of difficulties to public administration. Another aspect was the dimension of the parishes 
which was often too small to provide services to the citizens and the services had to be 
performed by elected representatives, with obvious restrictions to local autonomy. 
 
With the 1970 reform the number of counties was reduced to 14 and the municipalities to 275 
and this set the foundations for the restructuring of the distribution of tasks and cost burdens 
between the different levels of governments – state, counties and municipalities, enabling the 
transfer of tasks to municipalities and counties. Before 1970 local governments were financed 
by the state through reimbursements, after this reform a good part of the reimbursements were 
replaced by general state grants, and the financial equalization schemes between rich and poor 
municipalities developed. With this change a better correlation between competences of 
decision and financial responsibility of municipalities and counties was achieved. This 
structure remained until 2007.  
 
In 2002 the government re-initiated the discussion on the structure of the public sector and, in 
January 2004, the Commission on Administrative Structure concluded that a new reform was 
required. The driver was the fact that the size of the counties and municipalities was below the 
threshold dimension for good performance (set around 20.000 inh.). The three main 
arguments of the Commission were3:  
 
• A major part of the current administrative units are too small considering the 
performance required by the legislators today;  
• In a number of areas it is difficult to ensure a consistent and coordinated effort. 
The problem is mainly based on the fact that responsibility for some tasks has 
been divided between several decentralized administrative units. The result is s 
risk of “grey zones” 
• In some areas there are problems due to parallel functions/tasks in several 
administrative units. This makes it more difficult for the administrative units to 
coordinate and prioritize task performance and to improve efficiency and quality  
 
After extensive public discussion the decision of undertaking a new reform was adopted with 
the commitment that no higher taxes or increase in public expenditure would accrue from the 
reform. So changes were based in the principle that the reform would be neutral when it 
comes to expenditure and corresponding funds should follow the tasks, wherever change 
occurs. This imposed a balance on financial burden between authorities taking new tasks and 
authorities giving up those tasks. The Ministry reports that the reduction of the number of 
local politicians by itself represents DKK 365 million per year as from 2007, with the saving 
alone being able to finance interest and payment over five years on loans amounting to 
approx DKK 1.7 billion (with and interest rate of 3%). At this stage the estimation of cost 
involved in the implementation of the reform are, according to the Ministry, approx 1.2 
billion, including DKK 750 million for IT adjustments, aprox DKK 175 million for 
relocations, approx DKK 75 million for employee reorganization and approx DKK 175 
million for remuneration of integration committees in 2006. No estimates for the Transport 
sector alone were available.  
 
                                                 
3 Recommendation of the Commission on Administrative Structure, Ministry of Interior and Health, Department of Economics, The local 
government reform 
The 2007 reform, continued the work of the 1970 reform, abolished the counties and instead 
five regions were created. A total of 98 municipalities will replace the previous 271. A 
recommendation from the parties behind the reform that new municipalities should aim at 
30.000 inhabitants and a minimum size of 20.000 inhabitants should be respected. Smaller 
communities should merge into new, and larger, municipalities, or enter into voluntary 
binding partnerships (just as the case for Brazil referred in next section).  
 
Municipalities were asked to take decisions on their future and, according to the Ministry, the 
new map of jurisdiction in Denmark resulted from the following decisions:  
 
• 65 merged municipalities;  
• 33 unchanged municipalities. Seven of these with less than 20.000 inh (five of 
which are islands) and, consequently, they enter into binding partnerships 
• 11 municipalities were divided as a result of local referenda 
 
The tasks involved in the local and regional public bus transport will be undertaken by new 
transport companies established by the regions. Each municipality will participate in a 
transport company. Transport companies will be responsible for bus transport, fixing fares 
and ticketing systems, as well as schedules and coordination and planning. The municipalities 
will also be responsible for local roads (about 8.000 km out of a total of around 10.000 km of 
former county roads), private railroads and individual transport for disabled. Each transport 
company has nine members in the executive committee, with the regions appointing two 
members and the municipalities appointing seven members. The responsibility to establish the 
transport companies belongs to the Regions. The state will keep the general road network and 
the state railway. As an example the transport company Movia, responsible for Copenhagen 
buses and local rails,  is owned by 2 regions and 45 municipalities and offers a 
sales/expenditure ratio of 0,49 on a total yearly expenditure of 461 Million Euro to serve 2.4 
million inhabitants. 
 
The equalization scheme reflects a “user-pay” principle and ensures that the same level of 
service involves the tax percentage regardless of the income of the inhabitants and 
demographic factors. It is worth referring that the definition and metrics for the level of 
service for an urban mobility system is far from being stabilized among researchers and 
practitioners, being one of the areas that deserves research investment in the near future since 
the last decades provided this type of knowledge mostly on a modal perspective.  
 
At the moment our interviews were made it was still too early to assess potential barriers to 
the implementation of the reform. We could perceive a sense of general agreement with its 
content but still too many doubts on the new institutional relations. It is thus a learning 
process that deserves monitoring and feed-back adjustment.  
 
VOLUNTARY BINDING PARTNERSHIPS OF MUNICIPALITIES: THE CASES OF 
BRAZIL4 
In Brazil a new legislation was approved by the President, in early January 2007, to regulate 
the law of Public Partnerships, that allows the cooperation between Union, States, 
Municipalities and the Federal District, in the provision of several public services, like health, 
education, transport, etc. Each consortium can be formed by a minimum of two public entities 
(federated entities).  
                                                 
4 Information based on the authors experience obtained in their extensive field work in both countries 
It is a voluntary binding partnerships largely stimulated by successful experiences. Before this 
legislation came into force there were some experiences with public consortia working only as 
administrative agreements. The expectation of the federal government which is the promoter 
of the initiative is to increase the partnerships between small cities to reach minimum critical 
mass for the development of some services, with special focus on transport and public health, 
where about 2.000 partnership are already working5.  
 
The adoption of these voluntary binding public partnership in Brazil is assumed as a 
consequence of consensus governance methods promoted by Canada, with whom Brazil has a 
cooperation agreement for this domain. The Northwest Territories and Nunavut in Canada are 
taken as benchmark references for these experiences and these are the only two jurisdictions 
in Canada that operate under the consensus system of government rather than the more 
common systems of political parties. This consensus governance regime is understood to 
blend the principles of parliamentary democracy with the Aboriginal values of maximum 
cooperation, effective use of leadership resources and common accountability (SanJun Kim, 
2005, pp 12), although still requiring majority support for approval of measures.  
 
The legislation has had a successful implementation in Brazil and municipalities are rather 
positive about its potential benefits to overcome some existing bottlenecks. It is of course too 
soon for conclusions or even assessment but also here, like in the MPO case, this voluntary 
binding institutional arrangement has no direct competition with the incumbent structure of 
power at the three government levels. This may well represent a critical factor in a Federation 
without a clear hierarchy across government levels as it is the case of Brazil where 
municipalities are Federated bodies on equal standing to the Federated States and to the 
Federal District.  
 
CONCLUSIONS ON VARIABLE GEOMETRY  
With the exception of the MBO, all experiences reported in this paper are still rather young to 
enable sound conclusions on their benefits and inconveniences, although a trend towards 
diversified and creative forms of consensus governance across administrative levels seems to 
be emerging both in the developed and developing world.  
 
It is also possible to advance the preliminary conclusion that voluntary binding agreements of 
variable geometry entail considerable appeal for politician and local governments, and their 
acceptability seems to be based on the following attributes:  
 
• Voluntary binding agreements do not require permanent structures with associated 
powers, so they have a high degree of reversibility and consequently are perceived 
to have a lower risk of imposing unwanted change;  
• These agreements entail power sharing but they do not touch the rigid structure of 
power, only the one directly related to the initiative, that is the variable one;  
• Leadership can be exercised without establishing permanent hierarchies;  
 
For the society is general, these new forms of governance seem to bring also some benefits, 
such as:  
 
• Accountability is high but rewarding;  
                                                 
5 In Brasil there are more than 5.100 municipalities 
• Partnership search entails some competitive behaviour towards good performance 
in public management   
 
Like in any initiative there are also costs to consider, such as:  
 
• Decision-making processes tend to be longer and can generate considerable 
opportunity costs;  
• In situations of lack of consensus the system can be easily blocked since all 
members of the “consensus assembly” have similar power. 
• Voluntary partnership may promote the use of smaller planning units with a 
consequent loss of synergies. 
• Voluntary partnerships may be too fragile, and susceptible to demolition as a 
consequence of misunderstandings between politicians for some reason unrelated 
to the matters they address. 
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